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Abstract 
This paper compares outsourcing processes in France, Italy and Japan in two types of firms, large firms 
and also small firms. It is shown that outsourcing has increased over the last two decades in both small 
and large firms in all three countries and that mainly in the last decade the tendency has been to 
increasingly involve some of the suppliers in product development. We interpret this evidence by means 
of a cognitive framework related to the activity of information management. Specifically, we show that the 
more the relationships among suppliers and users are characterised by two-way communication, 
decentralised information processing, and accordingly balanced contractual power, the more the 
incentives to create knowledge and to innovate autonomously are guaranteed. 
JEL Classification: D23, L11, L22 
Keywords: Firm size, Information, Network, Outsourcing 
1.  Introduction 
Subcontracting and, more generally, productive outsourcing have diffused in all 
industrialised countries in the last thirty years. Attention to this phenomenon arose in 
the field of organised vertical markets in which vertical co-ordination by large firms has 
been progressively substituted by decentralised network of suppliers, governed by 
principles of lean production and just-in-time. Outsourcing has also been the more 
significant source of downsizing in local systems of small firms, implying that small 
firms remain small.
1 The result has been the growth in the informative and strategic 
interdependency among firms with numerous implications, ranging from the 
fragmentation of labour markets to the intensified use of information technology. 
Industrial economics has proposed various explanations for the diffusion of 
outsourcing. The bureaucratic costs of the large, integrated company have been outlined 
(Chandler 1962), as well as the incentive and the information processing costs (especially 
Aoki 1988). When products become increasingly differentiated and renewed, the best 
strategy appears to focus on core competencies and let other firms deal with the 
production of other parts, maintenance of machines or distribution (Clark and Fujimoto 
1991, Cusumano and Takeishi 1991). Thus, disintegrated firms have been shown to be 
more efficient in terms of lower costs or higher productivity by Aoki (1988) and 
Asanuma (1989) for the Japanese case, Coriat (1995), de Banville and Chanaron (1999) 
for the French case, Arrighetti (1999) and Conti and Menghinello (1998) for the Italian 
case. However, outsourcing yields other advantages, in particular in terms of product 
                                                 
1 See Acs and Audretsch (1990), (1993), Baldwin (1998) Carree and Thurik (1998), Doi and Cowling 
(1998), Henley (1994), Loweman and Sengenberger (1991), Traù (1997).  
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and process innovation. For instance, Clark and Fujimoto (1991) or Michie and Sheehan 
(1999) show that R&D and product innovation are higher in disintegrated firms.
2  
Concerning the organisation of production and market structure, such changes 
mean that the relevant unit of analysis becomes the relationships among firms rather 
than the single firm. In this paper we focus on the processes of outsourcing among 
firms that usually assume the form of subcontracting relationships. Specifically, 
outsourcing involves turning over the functions that fall outside firm’s core 
competencies to another firm whose core competencies are the functions being 
outsourced. In this way a specific governance form is created, which typically includes 
the exchange of proprietary information between the user and the supplier.  
This paper derives theoretical insights on such information exchanges by 
comparing some country cases. The aim is to show that the more a supplier is given 
autonomy of decision and, for this purpose, access to proprietary information, the 
higher the performance of the network (constituted by the user and the supplier(s)) in 
terms of innovation. The literature has amply shown the static efficiency advantages of 
outsourcing; in this paper, our aim therefore is to outline dynamic efficiency, more 
precisely learning leading to innovation. 
We focus on Japan, France and Italy. Japan has been chosen because it is a 
paradigm of an industrial system based on vertical networks, Italy for the historical 
predominance of small firms’ localised systems, and France for being the European 
country that experiences the largest decrease in vertical integration in the 1990s.
3 We 
review some empirical evidence related to two different types of supplier networks, 
namely networks characterised by the presence of large firms and more or less 
dependent suppliers (Section 2) and localised networks of small firms (Section 3). 
Sections 4 and 5 provide a theoretical framework for interpreting the empirical 
evidence. In particular, we outline the dynamic efficiency advantages (innovation) of 
supply relationships where the supplier is involved in decision-making and product 
development. Section 4 outlines some definitions, while section 5 examines the activity 
of information management involved in the production process in order to show these 
dynamic efficiency advantages. Specifically, the more the relationships among suppliers 
and users are characterised by two way communication, decentralised information 
processing, and accordingly balanced contractual power, the more the incentives to 
innovate autonomously and to improve firms’ efficiency are guaranteed. Finally, Section 
6 sets out some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Outsourcing processes of large firms 
 
Following the diffusion of the flexible production system, which combines 
economies of scale and scope by pushing product differentiation to the last stages of the 
                                                 
2 Heshmati (2003) offers an updated survey of the literature on the relation between productivity growth 
and outsourcing. 
3 According to Arrighetti (1999), who considers the UK, Germany, France and Italy, the largest decrease 
in vertical integration has occurred in France (-6,2%), more than the Italian case (-5,6%). Generally the 
degree of disintegration in France ends up quite similar to the Italian one, but very different from the 
other two countries. The rate of growth of outsourcing in France is also similar to the Italian rate and 
different from the English and German rates.   
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production process, unlike the Fordist system which exploited economies of scale only,
4 
large firms have progressively disintegrated vertically and established particular 
relationships with suppliers. Such relationships vary across countries and industries, but 
some regularity can be identified, into different models of subcontracting by large firms. 
The Japanese model of subcontracting has traditionally been seen as based on an 
asymmetry of bargaining power between a large downstream firm and small upstream 
firms.
5 The aims of subcontracting for large firms were primarily to reduce investment 
in fixed capital by shifting it to subcontractors, to exploit differences in wages between 
large and small firms (higher in the large firms), to reduce procurement costs, and often 
to try and shift the effects of temporary recessions to suppliers. Such imbalance of 
power was interpreted as a competitive pressure on suppliers: they have to reduce cost 
and provide the required quality otherwise they lose customers. Hence the incentive for 
performance was much higher than in the case where the supplier was part of a 
vertically integrated firm, whatever the degree of centralisation of the firm and the 
autonomy of the division producing the parts. 
  Such relationships between large firms and their suppliers have 
progressively become more complex and involve more than pressure for performance. 
Aoki (1988) and Asanuma (1989) were the first to support this argument. In particular, 
Asanuma claimed that the Japanese subcontracting relationships have four main 
characteristics. First, relationships are long-term and duration is determined by the 
product life cycles. Each time a new product is launched, the large firm makes a sort of 
call for the best offer from suppliers. At that stage, suppliers compete. Firms however 
tend to keep the same suppliers; product change is therefore an occasion to renegotiate 
the contract. Second, the Japanese subcontracting relationship is institutionalised and 
hierarchically organised. Subcontractors are differentiated according to the type of 
product bought by the large firm. The first type consists in traded products, which are 
bought on the market without any intervention in design by the large firm. In this case, 
the subcontractors are chosen on the basis of quality, and constitute the most 
autonomous subcontractors. They are “general suppliers” and “ordinary 
subcontractors” according to Asanuma’s definition. The second type is made of ordered 
products, which can be designed either by the supplier or the large firm itself (or 
jointly). In the latter case, the supplier only executes orders from the large firms 
according to its indications, and is very dependent on the large firm. Suppliers designing 
or co-designing the product enjoy more bargaining power. Both cases however 
constitute the first layer of the hierarchy of subcontractors: first-tier suppliers and 
associated companies. Third, the Japanese subcontracting relationship is contractual and 
characterised by specific procedures. According to Asanuma, such procedures unfold as 
follows. After a supplier is chosen, when the new product is still in the development 
phase, a basic contract is made, with broad specification (no specification of quantities 
to be delivered, neither of prices, etc.). The contract is made more precise as decisions 
on the manufacturing process are made, using complementary contracts.
6 Last, suppliers 
are contractually encouraged to innovate since they can enjoy the payoffs of their 
innovation for a certain time period (e.g. one year at Toyota).  
                                                 
4 See Labory (1997), for a discussion of the flexible production system and associated strategies on 
product markets. 
5 See Miwa (1995), (1996), for an account of this view. 
6 Quantities and prices start to be fixed in a very precise way especially in case of just-in-time production 
(see Coriat 1991).  
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  Therefore, in Japan, the relationship between the large firm and its 
suppliers is characterised by the coexistence of co-operation and competition. 
Competition prevails in the suppliers’ selection phase, but also after the contract has 
been signed. The performance of suppliers in terms of quality and costs are indeed 
constantly assessed and compared with other suppliers. If the supplier does not perform 
well, orders are reduced and, in the last resort, the supplier is changed. However, the 
large firm has also interest in co-operating with the supplier to avoid switching and 
associated costs (time to learn the specification of the product, the technology of 
production, time required to set up trust, etc.). Consequently, the large firm also seeks 
stable relationships with its suppliers, helping to resolve problems and continuously 
exchanging information in order to improve the system. The know-how generated by 
such a relationship is twofold. On the one hand, it is technical, regarding the product 
and production system. On the other hand, it is “relational”, due to the incentives and 
knowledge creation generated by the coexistence of co-operation and competition. 
  Aoki (1995) gives other insights into this issue by conceptualising the 
notion of relational rents. According to Aoki, “group-specific returns” are created by 
the co-operative relationships between the user and the supplier. Such benefits 
constitute a relational rent in the sense that they are generated by the high informational 
efficiency of the contractual relationship developed within the network. Such efficiency 
allows enjoying the benefits of vertical integration in terms of co-ordination while also 
enjoying the advantages of markets, in that incentives to innovate are provided. 
  Hence information flows in the Japanese supply network are intense and 
complex. Technological and market information are shared so that the co-ordination of 
the production process and a common language are established. However, the supplier 
specialises in an autonomous way and therefore has scope to develop ideas and 
innovate. One could characterise the advantage of such network as the result of 
specialisation (dealing with a particular subset of the overall information set related to 
the development of the product) and sharing of generic knowledge (exchange of 
information and collective creation of knowledge) that imply both co-ordination and 
innovation. A source of recent evidence on this point is given by the Reports of the 
Japanese SMEA (Small and Medium Enterprises Agency). According to them, in the 90s 
the structure of subcontracting has definitively changed in the direction of greater 
partnership between the various participants. Thus, Japanese subcontractors have raised 
their profiles by enhancing product quality and by diversifying away from one main 
contractor. This evolution is clearly linked to a technological up scaling of smaller firms. 
The criteria for the selection of subcontractors by large firms have accordingly changed. 
The demand for “thorough cost reduction”, “greater quality and precision”, or “quality 
assurance” double their importance when compared with the early 1980s and now rank 
first. Conversely, the more traditional demands for “stable quantities of products”, 
“fixing delivery time” drop sharply in significance. This changing nature of outsourcing 
has lead to a more horizontal network of inter-firm relationships that goes beyond the 
vertical keiretsu structure. 
In Italy, most large firms have outsourced by adjusting to subcontractors' 
characteristics and radically changing their internal organization. For instance, Camuffo 
and Volpato (2001) describe the case of the car industry, while Crestanello (1999) 
discusses the textile and clothing industry case. First-tier subcontractors have tended to 
become less numerous and to take responsibility not only for the production of specific 
parts but for technological innovation and components design as well. In addition,  
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outsourcing increasingly concerns production services, be they low added value and 
more labour-intensive services (security, cleaning and catering) or more complex 
services such as logistics, computer maintenance, or transportation.  
In the case of the textile industry, Crestanello (1999) distinguishes two main 
types of suppliers according to their degree of autonomy. The first type is the dependent 
supplier, which just executes orders from the client firm. This kind of relationship is 
hierarchical, and information flows are typically one-way, from the user to the supplier. 
The second type is more autonomous and is involved in co-design of products. The 
subcontractor in this case faces more competitive pressure, from other potential 
suppliers, but has more bargaining power on the price of the product. 
  Insights into the characteristics of these relationships in the car industry 
are given by the example of the carmaker Fiat. Recent works (Volpato and Stocchetti 
2000, Bianchi, Enrietti and Lanzetta 2001, Camuffo and Volpato 2001) show that 
outsourcing is relatively common at Fiat, in both production and services. While in the 
1970s and 1980s, outsourcing concerned mainly low value added production phases, 
since the late 1980s it involved important production phases such as the assembly of 
suspension units and crucial services like plant maintenance and logistics. The most 
evident measure of the extent of this process is given by the reduction in employment 
level by 38 per cent from 133,431 units in 1990 to 82,450 units in 1999 despite the 
maintenance of the same production level. 
The downsizing of Fiat has been accompanied by the restructuring of the 
suppliers’ relationships. Subcontractors are divided into three groups. The first-level 
subcontractors are those producing more complex components that are designed in 
close collaboration with Fiat and that are usually modules to be assembled internally by 
Fiat. The other two groups produce more standardised components and their activity is 
relatively more independent from Fiat.  
The rationale for outsourcing appears to be the increase in the specialisation of 
activities. Subcontractors are chosen on the basis of their specific technical knowledge 
and not of lower labour costs.
7 First-tier suppliers carry out specific tasks that 
correspond to a module. In order to make the different parts complementary, Fiat has 
organised the production of cars by arranging the different phases in such a way that the 
information necessary to produce each of them can be processed autonomously. While 
in the past car components were designed and engineered by the car manufacturer who 
led the whole project and suppliers simply manufactured them, the supply chain is now 
decentralised according the pattern described in Volpato and Stocchetti (2000, p. 9): 
First, the fundamental aspect of coordination based upon ex ante planning is that any 
individual operator does not need information on the whole chain of operations. Any 
chain operator must know only start and end date for a given activity, and must be 
concerned about precisely meeting its specific deadline. This implies a hierarchical 
management of information. But forms of simultaneous coordination on the whole of 
operations, aimed at compressing chain slacks require on line access to the whole 
sequence of operations, in order to carry out adaptations any time in which downwards 
demand triggers a wave of change which involves the whole upward operation chain. In 
                                                 
7 This change of perspective has important consequences for collective bargaining. Trade unions are 
indeed successful in extending their bargaining power to the subcontractors. For example, an agreement 
signed in 1998, which externalises logistics from Fiat Mirafiori's establishment to a Dutch multinational, 
keeps all the rights provided by the old agreement (the kind of employment contract, the benefits 
available in Fiat, the guarantee of job security and insurance for accident) to the new relationship.  
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other words, this implies forms of network connections among operators. The decision 
making processes related to product development involve both the car manufacturer 
and first tier suppliers. According to the continuous improvement both in product and 
process technology, nowadays the competencies that are necessary in order to 
manufacture a competitive car encompass a wide range of fields of expertise. As a result, 
critical decisions might often take place in an inter-firm process and thus an agreement 
among peers could be required. 
  The involvement of first-tier suppliers in the product development 
process implies their access to some strategic information of the large firm. The main 
consequence is that the supplier gains bargaining power and the relationships between 
the large firm and the suppliers become contractually more balanced. Given the 
possibility of opportunism and resulting hold-up problem, duration is substantial, 
related in practice to the product life cycle. Even in this case, the long duration of 
relationships allows enjoying some of the benefits of vertical integration, while 
simultaneously avoiding its drawbacks, such as the lack of incentive for performance for 
the component maker. It is noteworthy that Fiat incurred the problem of excessive 
outsourcing: some R&D functions have also been delegated to outside suppliers and it 
seems that this lead the large firm to lose too much control over the strategic phases of 
the production process; after the bad performance of the firm, Fiat has tended to re-
internalise some of these functions. 
In France, the relationships with suppliers have increasingly been defined as 
“partnership” relationships, characterised by a system of reciprocal commitments, 
whereby the supplier commits to delivery time, quality and price, while the contractor 
commits to order time, participation in investment and transfer of techniques and 
know-how. The transfer of techniques and know-how can take the form of the 
provision by the large firm of some of its machinery, or the maintenance and switching 
of tools, and technical co-operation (on manufacturing methods, product specifications 
and so on). 
Until the 1970s, the dominance of the large firm over its suppliers was total: 
technical, industrial and commercial, and the relationships with suppliers were based on 
the criterion of minimum price for the specific volume. Delivery time was secondary 
and solved by stocks. Such Fordist inter-industrial practices (with the division of tasks, 
specialisation, the separation of conception and manufacturing and one-way – top to 
bottom – information flows) was characterised by: 
- open booking: no contract was signed and the supplier had to face fluctuations 
in demand with strict price controls; 
- high competition: the large firm kept several potential suppliers for each part, 
so that only the least cost supplier was chosen; 
- no autonomy on product development, only execution of orders from the large 
firm. 
Hence the suppliers’ scope and incentives to innovate were limited.  
  After the 1970s, new relationships have progressively been set up, following 
both the vertical disintegration of large firms and the imitation of the Japanese model. 
Besides JIT, French firms imitated some aspects of the particular contractor-supplier 
relationships, such as the already-mentioned pyramidal structure and both the financial 
participation in some subcontractors and the establishment of suppliers’ clubs, with the 
first-tier suppliers only. In Japan, such clubs are kyoryokukai. Partnership relationships 
have several characteristics, close to the Japanese model: trust, based in mutual  
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commitment; technological expertise of the supplier on its product (not just execution 
of orders); short delivery times (JIT); and duration: procurement contracts are signed.  
In terms of information flows and knowledge exchange, two phases have to be 
distinguished. In a first phase, broadly in the 1980s, French producers outsource to 
reduce costs. Hence relationships remain authoritative, the buyer making precise 
requirements to the supplier and the supplier having mainly execution tasks. More 
recently, in what can be called a second phase, broadly in the 1990s, co-operative 
relationships have been developed with some suppliers, involving them earlier in the 
component design process (Dyer 1996, de Banville and Chanaron 1999). Important 
changes occur: the supplier has progressively been involved in product development 
and innovation; profit gains and technological and economic information have been 
shared. Hence information flows in the partnership relationships have become two-way 
and differentiated, as in the Japanese model (Leclerc, Perrin and Villeval 1999). While 
generic information is shared and constitutes the common denominator of the network, 
each actor specialises in a certain part of the overall information set related to the final 
product. Such features regard the first tier of suppliers because it is the only tier to be 
involved in co-design. Information advantages are similar to those of the Japanese case. 
These three national cases points to a number of hypotheses that can be 
theoretically checked: 
1.  Large firms tend to develop horizontal networks with their first tier suppliers 
who are involved not only in cost reduction and time saving in production 
but co-design and innovation as well. 
2.  Moving from lower tiers to the first tier of the supplier network, information 
flows between the buyer and the suppliers shift from one-way information 
flows. 
3.  These processes, which lower firms’ average size, seem to improve the 
suppliers’ autonomous capacity of innovation.  
The next section examines the case of outsourcing among small firms. 
 
3.  Outsourcing processes of small firms 
 
Although large firm disintegration has been a major factor to the growth of the 
occupational share of small firms, the process of outsourcing among small firms has 
also been significant in France, Italy and Japan, where vertical disintegration has 
concerned an increasing number of firms since the 1970s.  
Regarding Japan, the “White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan” 
(SMEA 2001) offers interesting evidence. Like in the large firm case, supplier 
relationships among small firms have also moved from pure cost reduction orientation 
to more flexible interactions and more product development initiative.  
Although there is historical evidence that the probability of working as 
subcontractor is negatively related to firm size in many Japanese industries in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Kimura 2002), the data collected for the Survey of the structure of subcontract work 
in Japan, published by SMEA since 1996, shows that in the 1990s a radical restructuring 
of the subcontracting relationships occurred. The percentage of small firms engaged in 
exclusive subcontracting contracts halved during the period 1987-1995, while dispersed 
and semi-dispersed contracts increased by more than twenty per cent (SMEA 2001). 
Such a partial opening of supply chains and the consequent development of productive  
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structures with many apexes have lead small firms to higher specialisation. In particular, 
the requirements of buyers to their suppliers have significantly changed even for lower 
tiers. The changing nature of subcontracting relationships naturally led to network 
structures with more intense communication among small firms, flexibly extending 
beyond  keiretsu and rearranging more horizontally the whole Japanese supply chain 
(Lakshmanan and Okumura, 1995). 
  This change of attitude takes us far from the more diffuse patterns of 
subcontracting relationships of the 1960s and the 1970s, when small firms mainly played 
the role of suppliers of low cost labour. This population of small firms, mainly 
composed of capacity subcontractors,
8 had a comparative advantage for the "dualistic" 
Japanese manufacturing industry (Koshiro, 1990) where "the abuse by large firms of 
their subcontractors was one of the most significant political issues" (Friedman, 1988, p. 
166). The turning point can be dated from the early 1990s, when the high yen crisis, 
following the 1985 appreciation of the yen, (Glasmeier and Sugiura, 1991) represented 
an external shock causing a process of selection above all among the capacity 
subcontractors whose productive activity was reduced in favour of outward direct 
investment. At the same time, a gradual increase of specialised subcontracting was 
necessary to cope with the shift of the Japanese system toward production at a higher 
technological level. Even if this process had the net effect of reducing the employment 
of small Japanese firms as a whole, because the shrinking of the large population of 
capacity subcontractors was only partially compensated by the growth of specialised 
subcontractors, it contributed to improve domestic efficiency by reflecting the growing 
importance of technical change in relation to simple cheap-labour advantages of 
capacity subcontractors (Carnazza et al., 2001). Market characteristics and technological 
change can explain why outsourcing has become the main pattern of relationships even 
among small firms: specialisation has allowed them to improve their capacity to process 
information and build contractually more balanced, specialised and innovative 
partnerships with other small firms.  
Finally, this process has increased the importance of industrial clusters of small 
firm in the Japanese industrial organisation. According to the 1996 SMEA survey, there 
are 537 clusters widely dispersed across Japan. Most of them are characterised by the 
presence of hierarchically structured relationships between manufacturers, first-tier 
suppliers, and second-tier suppliers. At the same time a detailed analysis by Yamawaki 
(2002) of a sample of 14 major cases of Japanese manufacturing clusters concludes that: 
“Among the advantages identified in the paper, that created by the existence of 
specialised suppliers in a localised industry is considered the most important element in 
creating agglomeration economies. A supplier’s skills and capabilities complement other 
suppliers’ skills and capabilities, which in turn complement manufacturers’ skills and 
capabilities. Through such a network, firms develop the skills specific to a cluster.” 
(Yamawaki 2002, p. 139).  
For the Italian case, a recent study promoted by the Bank of Italy (Signorini, 
2000) analyzes the processes of outsourcing among small firms in the Italian industrial 
districts. The main finding – confirmed by Conti and Menghinello, 1998, Corò and 
                                                 
8 Carnazza, Innocenti and Vercelli (2001), distinguish between capacity and specialised subcontracting. 
Specialised subcontracting means a relationship between a contractor and a subcontractor where the 
former continuously relies on the latter for the supply of an input for which there is no in-house supply. 
Capacity-based subcontracting indicates a relationship where the contractor hands over supply to the 
subcontractor only in the case of temporarily high levels of demand (Carnazza et al., 2001).  
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Grandinetti, 1999, and Innocenti, 2003) – is that the processes of outsourcing 
characterised by high levels of knowledge specificity and product quality only involve 
firms belonging to the same local system, among which vertical cooperation is arranged 
on the basis of long term duration, explicit ex-ante agreements and implicit renewal over 
time. Production characterised by low knowledge specificity and intensive use of labour 
is shifted to low labour costs countries. The latter type of subcontracting is however 
considered valuable only if close co-operation between the contractor and the 
subcontractor is not crucial. 
The difference between these two types of subcontracting can be better pointed 
out by describing what changes have concerned subcontracting relationships in 
industrial districts since 1970. These patterns of evolution are very similar to those 
sketched above for the case of the outsourcing of large vs. small firms. A significant part 
of these relationships among small firms turned from one-way to two-way information 
flows. Two major factors explain this change. First, the increased technological level of 
production induces small firms to increase their specialisation. This implies the creation 
of more stable agreements, the multiplication of the tiers of subcontractors and more 
balanced contractual powers between suppliers and buyers. At the same time, capacity-
based subcontracting, which was largely used in the past as excess capacity to be 
exploited during temporary phases of demand expansion, becomes less attractive. 
Second, the final markets in which Italian industrial districts are specialised have become 
increasingly fragmented. The production of these local systems is largely concentrated 
on the high quality segments of three macro-sectors: the so-called "fashion system" 
(textiles, leather, clothes, shoes, glasses); the goods for the house (wood, furniture, 
ceramics, accessories); the machinery produced for the previous two macro-sectors. 
These production systems have acquired the characteristics of niche markets, where 
customer needs are deeply diversified and the product life cycle has shortened. Rather 
than price, firms' market strategies are increasingly dependent on design innovation, 
product differentiation, customisation, after-sales services and brand loyalty. These 
requirements appear to be only satisfied by intensifying the process of outsourcing and 
asking suppliers to co-develop products or parts. 
Concerning French small firms, a number of empirical studies surveyed in 
Aniello and Le Galés (2001) interpret the recent restructuring process of French 
manufacturing as a transformation of the industrial organisation towards clusters similar 
to the Italian industrial districts. This process is in fact a local rooting of production by 
the setting up of supplier networks between small firms, whose origin can be traced 
back to the evolution of the relationships between large and small firms described in the 
previous section: the shift towards more involvement of suppliers in co-design and 
productive innovation has been also followed by small firms and their suppliers (Courlet 
and Pecqueur 1991, Ganne 1992).  
A specific case is the region of Mediterranean France, where a virtuous process 
of development has been triggered by a network of small and medium enterprises, 
which were historically prevalent in this region (Hansen 1990). The processes of vertical 
disintegration have caused the emergence of specialised areas where inter small firms’ 
linkages allow to exploit external economies through the expansion of the regional 
network as a whole. 
In general there is a growing strand of literature on the French industry in which 
the development of trust between large and small firms and the creation of partnerships 
between contractors and subcontractors are assessed as the main factor enhancing  
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productivity (Linhart 1991, Lorenz 1992, Lorenz 1993, Gorgeu and Mathieu 1993). 
These contributions support the view that small firms increase generally their 
autonomous capacity of innovation and consequently of making profits by specializing 
in narrower production phases and by outsourcing the pruned processes to other small 
firms. According to these authors this evolution has improved the French industry's 
international competitiveness. 
Overall, this outline of the outsourcing process of small firms supports similar 
hypotheses to those outlined in the previous section: 
1.  The advantages of being small mainly result from the opportunity to 
specialise in narrower phases of the productive chain.  
2.  In the 1990s, small firms prefer to outsource any activity other than their core 
activity because externalization increases the probability of innovation. 
3.  Although communication costs may be higher in local systems of small firms 
than in hierarchically dominated organisations, horizontal competition 
permits to maintain efficiency. Independent small firms tend to base their 
competitiveness on the dominance of a niche market, where it is essential to 
maintain a monopolistic position. Therefore, small firms are particularly 
keen on keeping their strategic information and not leaking it to potential 
competitors. They actively cooperate vertically with other small suppliers 
and users but they also compete horizontally by protecting their own 
specificity. 
Hence during the 1990s the trend in outsourcing has been to increasingly 
involve suppliers in decision-making, suppliers not being merely executors of orders but 
having a say in both the production organisation of their product and product 
development. Such rising involvement only concerns however a limited number of 
suppliers, those of the first tiers. Hence between the firm and its first tier of supplier a 
more balanced network is established, in that the relationship is less hierarchical and 
authoritative. This generates not only static efficiency effects (cost reduction) but also 
dynamic efficiency effects (innovation) that have not been extensively discussed and 
demonstrated in both the empirical and theoretical literature. Therefore, we provide in 
the next sections a theoretical framework for understanding these latter effects. 
 
4.  The network as an information conveyor 
 
The first step in defining the theoretical framework is to provide some 
definitions. In the first place, we assume that knowledge is, to some degree, always tacit, 
while information is the only part of knowledge that can be transferred. Knowledge can 
be considered as an infinite set – mainly because it is the outcome of a mental process – 
that includes information as a closed set (Fransman 1994). While information can be 
communicated, knowledge cannot ever be communicated perfectly. In other words, 
information is knowledge made explicit that can be communicated to others. The 
process of knowledge creation can be described as a sequence where the subject collects 
information, that is explicit knowledge communicated by others, and combines it with 
the previously possessed knowledge, which is both explicit and tacit. The outcome is 
new knowledge that is only partially communicated to others.  
We also assume a specific meaning of hierarchy. Hierarchy has been defined as a 
system where "only a few individuals (or only one individual) can undertake projects,  
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while others provide support in decision making", as opposed to a polyarchy, i.e. a 
system in which "there are several decision makers who can undertake projects (or 
ideas) independently of one another" (Sah and Stiglitz 1986, p. 716). This definition 
helps to compare the integrated firm, i.e. a self-contained hierarchical system, with the 
decentralised network, which is a polyarchy where several independent decision makers 
autonomously undertake productive projects. By the same token, if the integrated firm 
is the place where all residual rights of control accrue to the owner, then the 
decentralised network can be seen as a system in which multiple owners possess rights 
of control on separate competencies.  
The choice of an organisational pattern can thus be represented as the selection 
of a point on the line joining the extreme cases of the fully hierarchical firm, which can 
be defined as an ideal organization collecting all the productive units under only one 
hierarchy, and the "monadic" network, which is a network in which each producer is an 
autonomous decision-maker. Outsourcing, which corresponds to the decentralization of 
competencies, represents a movement along the direction going from the fully 
hierarchical firm to the totally decentralised network. In this setting all the intermediate 
types of organizations have to deal with the same problem that is to co-ordinate in the 
presence of specialisation. Taking the above definition of information and knowledge, 
this activity amounts to internally diffuse the information necessary to make 
complementary the specialist knowledge possessed by the various decision-makers. Co-
ordination has to be obtained while minimising knowledge transfers because 
"Communication, like decision making, is always imperfect. No individual ever fully 
communicates perfectly what he knows to another" (Sah and Stiglitz 1986, p. 717). In 
this way the process of information management becomes a key variable to explain 
performance differentials across different organizational structures.  
According to this interpretation, the network would assume the role of 
information conveyor, which diffuses information among firms possessing separate 
pieces of knowledge. The choice of the most efficient organisation and the boundary of 
the firm would depend on the degree of decentralisation that is optimal when it makes 
each firm able to collect and process all the information pertinent to the specialist 
knowledge it owns. Specifically, separate firms could efficiently conduct two adjacent 
production phases if a single firm can process all the information concerning each phase 
without the knowledge employed in the other production phase. By specialising in the 
processing of a narrower set of information, each firm can establish a full 
correspondence between the information it processes and the information that is 
pertinent to the knowledge they utilise. 
 
5.  A phase model of outsourcing 
 
The empirical literature summarised in sections 2 and 3 shows that small and 
large firms share similar patterns in the diffusion of the processes of outsourcing in 
France, Italy and Japan. In both cases outsourcing is associated with the intensification 
of competition mainly based on non-price factors. Regardless of their size, firms have 
developed horizontal networks with their main suppliers, first tier suppliers being 
involved not only in cost reduction and time saving in production but also in 
information processing and knowledge creation. They have implemented a two-phase 
outsourcing strategy. First, outsourcing aimed at cost reduction was limited to second  
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tier suppliers involved in structured tasks such as scheduling and logistics or in activities 
characterised by low knowledge specificity. Second, first tier suppliers have been 
involved in product development, and thus have started to create their own strategic 
knowledge. As a result information flows that were one-way flows, whereby the buyer 
gives orders to the supplier and the latter executes, have transformed into two-way 
communication. This has occurred since design and specifically innovation is a complex 
task, which requires a high level of specialisation (accumulation of specific knowledge) 
together with intense communication (between modules specialising in specific kinds of 
knowledge).  
This evolution can be interpreted on the basis of the definitions given in Section 
4 and hinges on two issues. The first concerns information management, that is, the 
process through which productive units collect, process and transmit information with 
the purpose of creating knowledge. The second issue is that of making the different 
pieces of knowledge created through the managing of information complementary. 
The management of information can be viewed as comprising three phases, each 
defined by problems, decisions to be taken and sources of costs (see table 1). 
 
Table 1 The management of information 
Phases Main  problems  Decisions  Costs 
Choice of senders  Selection costs 
1. Collection  
of information  









with implementation Matching costs 
2. Processing  
of information 
Partition of decision-making 
and implementation 
 









costs  3.Transmission 
of information  
Tacit knowledge 
 
Information appropriability  Choice of receivers  Appropriability 
costs  
 
The first phase is information collection. The subject who collects information 
has to choose the senders from whom he receives information and the criteria for 
collecting information. Both decisions imply costs – respectively selection and collection 
costs – that can be lowered by specialisation: a subject specialising in this phase 
progressively invests to build a receiving channel (Demsetz, 1991) that is used again for 
new information collection. Narrowing the scope of information collection reduces the 
cost of information collection but also reduces the variety of information collected. This 
weakens the absorptive capacity of the firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), resulting in a 
narrowing of its knowledge base.  
The second phase is information processing. The information collected in the 
first phase is complemented by the knowledge previously possessed by the decision 
maker. Costs are given by matching the decision with the subjects who implement it 
(matching costs) and by the time elapsing between the information processing and the 
implementation of the decision (communication costs). Both costs are influenced by  
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specialisation. In particular, the efficiency of this phase depends on the net effect of the 
reduction of matching costs due to the decrease in the number of decisions 
implemented by the processing subject and of the increase in communication costs 
necessary for connecting the act of decision-making and of implementation (Bolton and 
Dewatripont, 1994). De Canio and Watkins (1998) show that an increase in the 
capabilities of processing allows a flattening of the organisations mainly by decreasing 
matching costs. 
The third phase is information transmission in which modalities of transmission 
are chosen and receivers are selected. The sources of costs are both transmission costs, 
which depend on the sender’s skill of conveying tacit knowledge through information, 
and appropriability costs, which are determined by the capacity of the receiver to exploit 
information to create knowledge. 
By applying this classification, we define the decentralisation of information as 
the increase in the share of information processed by the same subject who collects it. 
In the firm, the decentralisation of information increases when the task of coping with 
emergent events of a specified activity is transferred hierarchically downwards (Aoki 
1986). This implies that the upper layers don’t need to process information related to 
that specific activity and that all the information collected by the lower layer is processed 
directly by the collector. Similarly, the decentralisation of information in the network is 
given by the increase of the share of information processed by the same firm, which 
collects it. We can define a network as fully hierarchical if it includes a single firm 
processing all the information, including that collected by the other members of the 
network. In contrast, the same firm that collects it in a fully decentralised network 
processes each piece of information. In the intermediate cases, information will be 
partially transmitted by the collecting firm to another firm for processing it. In as far as 
independent decision-making is the outcome of decentralised information processing, 
the difference to be emphasised is not that between the firm and the network but that 
between a decentralised organisation – that is, a polyarchy where autonomous decision 
makers undertake projects independently – and a hierarchical organisation, where 
decisions are taken by the centre “overseeing” the whole production process. 
In the case of a network, the effects of the degree of information 
decentralisation can be examined by means of the classification given in Table 1. 
 
Phase 1 Collection of information.  
The receiver chooses the senders and the criteria for collecting information. In 
the fully hierarchical network, where only one firm processes information, these choices 
are made by the firms which collect information and not by the firm which processes it. 
This splitting between collecting and processing causes an increase in costs. The 
decentralisation of information reduces these costs by increasing the quantity of 
information processed by the same firm that collects it. The ability of collecting 
information is consequently improved and the risks of information overload falls. Both 
selection and collection costs decrease. If the relationship between supplier and user 
becomes long term the efficiency of this phase is further improved. As senders are the 
same and the same criteria are used and improved over time, scale economies in the 
collection of information can be fully exploited. 
 
Phase 2 Processing of information.   
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The processing of information makes collected information complementary to 
previously possessed knowledge. In the case of fully hierarchical networks, exclusively 
the firm which takes decisions processes information. The decision maker must give 
orders instead of information to the lower layers of the hierarchy because tacit 
knowledge must be excluded from the content of the orders. Otherwise the decision 
maker would lose the control of production. This centralised mode of functioning is the 
source of matching costs, namely to match the orders with the executing firm, and of 
communication costs, to diffuse orders among the firms of the network. In the 
decentralised network, reducing the number of firms that execute orders decreases 
matching and communication costs and increasing those who process the information 
they collect.  
 
Phase 3. Transmission of information.  
In the fully hierarchical network transmission costs increase in relation to the 
number of layers composing the hierarchy. The difficulties of conveying tacit knowledge 
by means of information increase with the distance between layers. The other source of 
cost, information appropriability, depends on the specificity of information. The more 
generic is the information transmitted by firms, the higher is the risk of being imitated. 
The decentralisation of information replaces the transmission of orders with the 
exchange of inputs between supplier and user. Tacit knowledge is incorporated into the 
inputs. Real communication is limited to the vertical communication between supplier 
and user. The proximity of their productive phases enhances their ability to 
communicate and lowers transmission costs. Appropriability costs are also reduced 
because information becomes more specific. Being production modularised, each 
module relies on its own exclusive knowledge and this prevents other productive units 
from appropriating the specific knowledge of the specialised unit. 
 
This representation of information management can also give insights into how 
decentralised information is made complementary across the network by improving the 
communication of tacit knowledge. If collaboration is limited to adjacent productive 
phases linked by long-term relationships and a continuous and frequent exchange of 
information, not only information but also tacit knowledge is progressively shared, 
allowing efficient complementarities between the two productive phases. Specifically, we 
can describe the establishment of relationships between suppliers and users as a 
sequence of three phases, which differ according to the state of the prominent 
information:  
a) The information is disseminated. The user decides to outsource the 
production of a new input and addresses a request to a population of potential 
suppliers. Some suppliers study the feasibility of the product specifying the range of 
possible investments. 
b) The information is shared. The user accepts one (or more) proposal on the 
basis of the outline of the product characteristics. The user and the supplier co-project 
the prototype of the input and make the investments. 
c) The information is modularised. The supplier produces the input and 
autonomously decides any change to the process that can derive from local shocks and 
unforeseen contingencies (errors, imperfections, adaptations to its own productive 
process). The user inserts the input in its product, autonomously introducing the 
adaptations that come from unforeseen contingencies relative to its production process.  
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Signals of problems can be derived from the market are solved in the decentralised 
mode by means of the information relevant to each specific module. 
This sequence creates and makes common to the user and the supplier a shared 
body of knowledge in the information sharing phase, in which the problem of 
complementarities between the adjacent stages are solved. After that, the process of 
information modularisation allows the firms' contractual power to be balanced since it 
prevents weakening the incentives for introducing innovations. If the firm collects, 
processes and transmits information and is also the residual claimant to the rents from 
innovation because it is protected from being expropriated of its specific knowledge, it 
will have strong incentives for improving its performance by creating new knowledge 
and consequently by innovating. It is specifically the increase in the amount of 
information processed by the collecting firm – that we have defined as the 
decentralisation of information – which creates better incentives for knowledge 
creation. 
 
6.  Concluding remarks 
 
The decentralisation of information, by delegating the processing of information 
to autonomous suppliers rather than keeping propriety or maintaining control over the 
whole productive chain of the network, make the production process complementary 
not through hierarchical arrangements but through a shared body of knowledge created 
in the phase of information sharing. Information decentralisation provides the suppliers 
with higher incentives to develop specialised knowledge related to the particular stage of 
the production process they are dealing with because their contractual power is 
protected and enhanced by the modularisation of information. 
Our phase model emphasises how the governance form of the production 
network is a key variable to create efficient suppliers’ networks. In particular, the 
balanced distribution of contractual power along the productive chain is a signal of the 
high degree of information decentralisation.  
This theoretical interpretation can also explain why large and small firms share 
similar patterns of relationships in the processes of outsourcing. For both types of firms 
information decentralisation leads to an increase in knowledge creation by the 
subcontractors. Information decentralisation also implies that incentives are enforced 
because users cannot easily replace suppliers and the contractual power is more equally 
distributed. In this way the pattern of governance traditionally characterizing 
relationships in local systems of small firms, especially in most Italian industrial districts, 
has been progressively extended to networks previously led by a large firm. This 
convergence has a number of implications for industrial policies. In particular, the 
financial support to the creation of medium and large firms in local systems of small 
firms, or the establishment of large plants in industrially underdeveloped regions may 
not be that advantageous in as far as they establish or maintain control over the present 
or the future network and take measures to monitor and to direct the activities of the 
suppliers, thereby reducing their innovative potential. Likewise the provision of business 
services or public support to consortiums and associations of firms are bound to fail if 
they are harmful to the contractual equilibrium. Policies aimed at establishing new local 
systems of production should take this point into consideration. For example, financial 
support to a large firm to enter into clusters of small firms is often seen positively  
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because small firms gain access to wider markets and to financial resources. Our analysis 
points to the risk that the difference in bargaining powers of the different actors may 
result in a distortion in information management, and a loss of capacity to create 
knowledge. The capacity of the whole network to create knowledge and develop 
innovation may therefore be weakened. 
In addition, the issue of what happens to the second and lower tier suppliers 
should also be addressed. We have shown that first tier suppliers can be involved in 
knowledge creation with the user and this increases the innovation performance of the 
network. However, we have not discussed what happens to lower tier suppliers: being 
excluded from this knowledge creation process, are they worse off? Are there 
possibilities of moving to first tiers lowered? Such questions are left for future research. 
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